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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PRESIDENTIAL
FOREIGN POLICYMAKING: THE CONTEMPORARY
THEORY OF A BIFURCATED PRESIDENCY
GEORGE STEVEN SWAN*
War is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement.1
The national security state consumes the presidency.2
War is the health of the State.'
INTRODUCTION
The following discussion assesses from a functionalist perspective
the theory of a bifurcated presidency. By functionalism is meant
social organization premised upon groupings or classifications as-
certained via activity, use, or specific contribution.4 Functionalism
is expressed through the policymaking division of labor among the
three branches of the federal government. By a bifurcated presi-
dency is meant one which shares power with its two sister branches
of the federal government in setting domestic policy, but need not
share power in making foreign policy.
The bifurcated presidency proposition was elaborated upon last
year by the Legal Advisor to the Counsel to the President, and the
U.S. Justice Department's Office of Policy Development Senior Ad-
* Associate Professor, North Carolina A & T State University; S.J.D., LL.M., Uni-
versity of Toronto; J.D., University of Notre Dame School of Law.
1. Madison, Letters of Helvidius, No. IV, reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 171, 174 (G. Hunt ed. 1906).
War is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement. In war, a physical force
is to be created; and it is the executive will, which is to direct it. In war, the public
treasures are to be unlocked; and it is the executive hand which is to dispense them.
In war, the honors and emoluments of office are to be multiplied; and it is the exec-
utive patronage under which they are to be enjoyed. It is in war, finally, that laurels
are to be gathered; and it is the executive brow they are to encircle.
Id.
2. Moynihan, The Peace Dividend, N.Y. Rev. Books, June 28, 1990, at 3, col. 1, 4.
U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan speaks with the authority of a former U.S. Ambassa-
dor to India, and former U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations.
3. Bourne, The State, in WAR AND THE INTELLECTUALS: ESSAYS BY RANDOLPH S.
BOURNE 1915-1919, at 65, 71 (C. Resek ed. 1964). "For war is essentially the health of the
State." Id. at 69.
4. DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 126 (H. Fairchild ed. 1967).
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visor. The following discussion addresses their presentation. This
general proposition simultaneously was, in effect, criticized by Yale
Law School Professor Harold Jongju Koh in his impressive treatise
of last year, The National Security Constitution;5 the substance of
that treatise is descriptively, although not normatively, consistent
with the Rivkin-Block presentation. The instant discussion draws
upon his work to throw into perspective the Rivkin-Block bifurcated
presidency theory.
I. THE THEORY OF A BIFURCATED PRESIDENCY
In their 1990 paper entitled Legislative Power-Grab: The Anti-
Federalist Counterrevolution in the Making,6 Legal Advisor to the
Counsel to the President David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Justice Depart-
ment Office of Policy Development Senior Attorney-Advisor Law-
rence J. Block propound what elsewhere has been styled the theory
of the "bifurcated presidency."7 Such a presidency shares power
with the other two branches of the federal government in domestic
policymaking but, as already noted, refuses powersharing in foreign
policymaking.8 Their paper encompasses sweeping claims of execu-
tive power.9 They contend that the President is to conduct foreign
affairs subject only to specific congressional checks, Congress lack-
ing authority to "codetermine"' 10 foreign policy. They assail as "the
neo-Antifederalist Party"'" such politico-legal critics as Leonard
Levy, 2 Anthony Lewis 3 and Theodore Draper 4 for arguing in
5. H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990).
6. 'The Constitution in Danger': An Exchange, N.Y. Rev. Books, May 17, 1990, at
50, col. 1. Lawrence J. Block and David B. Rivkin, Jr.'s half of this exchange they entitle
Legislative Power Grab: The Anti-Federalist Counterrevolution in the Making. Id. This pa-
per is a current version of Block & Rivkin, The Battle to Control the Conduct of Foreign
Intelligence and Court Operations: The Ultra-Whig Counterrevolution Revisited, 12 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 303 (1989). Only the former incorporates United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990). The respected William Goldsmith styles Block and Rivkin
"the two senior attorneys in the Bush Administration." Goldsmith, Letter to the Editor,
N.Y. Rev. Books, Aug. 16, 1990, at 60, col. 4. Goldsmith is the author of W. GOLDSMITH,
THE GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1974).
7. This is its characterization by Theodore Draper. 'The Constitution in Danger': An
Exchange, supra note 6, at 52, col. 2.
8. Id.
9. Taylor, Breaking Presidential Rule over Foreign Affairs, Miami Rev., May 23,
1990, at 9, col. 1.
10. 'The Constitution in Danger'" An Exchange, supra note 6, at 50, col. 2.
11. Id. col. 1.
12. Historian Leonard W. Levy is the author of, inter alia, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960); JEFFERSON AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE (1963); ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968);
JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1972); AGAINST THE LAW:
[Vol. 21
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favor of a broader congressional role in foreign relations.
According to Rivkin and Block,15 the Constitutional Convention
limited congressional powers to those granted in article I,16 and
limited the federal judicial power to an enumerated set of cases and
controversies in article 111.17 But article II vests the general execu-
tive power in the President alone.18 The general vesting clause of
executive power in article II vests in the executive alone any execu-
tive power inferrible from any part of the Constitution."
Rivkin and Block submit: "[I]t is clear that actions and decisions
of the Executive in the conduct of foreign policy are not subject to
direct legislative control by Congress."20 Again: "Congress does not
have unlimited power to indirectly impede presidential authority by
attaching conditions to appropriations that require the President to
relinquish any of his constitutional discretion in foreign affairs."'"
And again: "[T]he real problem bedeviling the American body pol-
itic is not presidential aggrandizement of his foreign affairs powers;
instead it is the imperial and highly partisan congressional foreign
policy micromanagement."22
Rivkin and Block acknowledge that the President participates in
the legislative process through the Presidential veto power.23 The
Senate exercises a limited executive power to confirm or deny exec-
utive appointments and to ratify or reject treaties. Congress as a
whole has authority to declare war and to impeach and try execu-
tive and judicial officers.24 Rivkin and Block assert, however, that
"until the recent wave of neo-Antifederalist revisionism, it had been
generally accepted that executive power does include a plenary
power over foreign affairs."25
THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1974); EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985);
CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS (1986); and THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE (1986).
13. Anthony Lewis is the author of, inter alia, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964).
14. Theodore Draper is the author of, inter alia, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN COMMU-
NISM (1957); AMERICAN COMMUNISM AND SOVIET RUSSIA (1960); CASTRO'S REVOLUTION:
MYTHS AND REALITIES (1962); CASTROISM, THEORY AND PRACTICE (1965); ABUSE OF
POWER (1967); ISRAEL AND WORLD POLITICS (1968); THE DOMINICAN REVOLT (1968); and
A PRESENT OF THINGS PAST: SELECTED ESSAYS (1990).
15. 'The Constitution in Danger': An Exchange, supra note 6, at 50, col. 4.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
17. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. 1.
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
19. 'The Constitution in Danger': An Exchange, supra note 6, at 50, col. 4.
20. Id. at 51, col. 3 to 52, col. 1.
21. Id. at 52, col. 1.
22. Id. at 52, col. 2.
23. Id. at 50, col. 2.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 51, col. 1.
1990]
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The United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp."6 opinion of
1936 inaugurated the contemporary period of a presidency, in ef-
fect, wholly unchecked in foreign policymaking by any judicially-
enforced constitutional principle." Curtiss-Wright is thereby analo-
gous to NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.28 After Jones &
Laughlin, Congress is, in effect, wholly unchecked in economic poli-
cymaking by any judicially-enforced constitutional principle.2 9 Both
are analogous to United States v. Carolene Products Co.30 After
Carolene Products, the federal judiciary (above all the Supreme
Court) in effect makes social policy (especially over the states)
wholly unchecked by any constitutional principle.
II. THE RIVKIN-BLOCK AUTHORITIES
Rivkin and Block understand the constitutional framework to
preclude the location of power concurrently in two or three
branches of government, 31 denying that "shared powers" exist.3 2
Their concept of executive power they trace in part to Locke, Mon-
tesquieu and Blackstone,33 all three of whom they suppose consti-
26. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
27. Swan, The Political Economy of the Burger Court: A Study in Constitutional
Functionalism, 7 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 359, 398-99 (1988).
28. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
29. Lawyer-political economy analyst Charlotte Twight has been blunt: "[Bly 1975
the national government in the United States possessed the power to regulate every aspect of
the national economy, however local a particular economic activity may appear, if it but
chose to exercise that power." C. TWIGHT, AMERICA'S EMERGING FASCIST ECONOMY 50
(1975).
30. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). "Faced with the threat
of Franklin Roosevelt's court-packing plan, the Supreme Court found it prudent to abandon
its ties to the conservative camp and to take up such issues as civil rights and civil liberties."
B. GINSBERG & M. SHEFTER, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: THE DECLINING IMPORTANCE OF
ELECTIONS IN AMERICA 19 (1990). "An alliance between the federal courts and liberal polit-
ical forces emerged during the postwar decades." Id. at 149. "In the 1970s and early 1980s,
liberal political forces came to rely even more extensively on judicial power." Id. at 20.
31. 'The Constitution in Danger': An Exchange, supra note 6, at 50, col. 2 (citing
Burns & Markham, Understanding Separation of Powers, 7 PACE L. REV. 575, 580 (1987)).
32. Id. at 50, col. 3. Theodore Draper points out the error in this view, citing a stan-
dard source to the effect that the 1787 Constitutional Convention erected a central govern-
ment of separate institutions sharing powers. Id. at 52, col. 3 (citing R. NEUSTADT, PRESI-
DENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM FDR TO CARTER 170 (1980)).
Draper's accurate point is a familiar one, even down to the authority Draper cites. See, e.g.,
Swan, The Political Economy of the Separation of Powers: Bowsher v. Synar, 17 CUMB. L.
REV. 795, 797 (1987) (citing R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEAD-
ERSHIP FROM FDR TO CARTER 26 (1980)). "Neustadt's point as made in this book has been
echoed regularly." Id. at 797 n.15. Only last year legal scholars were reminded that the
language of different institutions sharing powers in policymaking derives from Richard Neu-
stadt. H. KOH, supra note 5, at 4, 69, 230 n.10, 260 n.7 (citing R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL
POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 101 (rev. ed. 1976)).
33. 'The Constitution in Danger': An Exchange, supra note 6, at 50, col. 3.
[Vol. 21
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tuted an extraordinarily great influence upon the Founding genera-
tion.34 Each of these three favored placing foreign policymaking
authority exclusively within executive hands.3 5
Whatever the intrinsic merits of their case, Rivkin and Block are
on somewhat thin ice in reliance upon all three of these thinkers in
explicating the Constitution of 1787. A recent study of the political
writings of Americans published between 1760 and 1805 included
all books, pamphlets, newspaper articles and monographs printed
for public consumption; it produced 3,154 references to 224 individ-
uals." Citations surrounding the 1787-1788 debate on the Consti-
tution 7 reveal Montesquieu as the most heavily cited author, being
cited in twenty-nine percent of their citations by Federalist writers
and in twenty-five percent of their citations by Antifederalist writ-
ers; Blackstone is indeed in second place, being cited in seven per-
cent of their citations by Federalist writers and in nine percent of
their citations by Antifederalists.
Locke, however, was not at all cited by the Federalists, and was
cited in only three percent of citations by Antifederalists. sa (This
latter is ironic in the face of Rivkin and Block's characterization of
their opponents as Antifederalist counterrevolutionaries.) To be
sure, Blackstone himself cites Locke a number of times.3 9 Yet
Locke, who is heavily cited in the 1770s to justify the break with
England,40 and who is profound concerning the bases for opposing
tyranny, has little to say regarding institutional design 4 1 (e.g., the
Constitution). Worse, while Rivkin and Block cite Locke for his
The Second Treatise on Government,'2 Locke's two treatises had
only about one-third the availability of Locke's An Essay Concern-
ing Human Understanding43 from the libraries and booksellers of
34. Id. at 50 n.10.
35. Id. (citing J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 83, 92 (Bobbs-Mer-
rill ed. 1952); C. DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 (Hafner ed. 1949)
(1748); and W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 244 (1979)
(1765)).
36. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century
American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 189, 191 (1984).
37. Id. at 194.
38. Id. at 195.
39. Id. at 193. The framers "were raised on English and European ideas--on Locke,
filtered through Blackstone, and on Montesquieu." L. HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOC-
RACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 4 (1990).
40. Lutz, supra note 36, at 192.
41. Id.
42. 'The Constitution in Danger': An Exchange, supra note 6, at 50 n.10 (citing J.
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (Bobbs-Merrill ed. 1952)).
43. J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (P. Nidditch ed.
1990]
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the founding era." References to Locke's Second Treatise often
display a comparative dearth of comprehension thereof.
45
Nothing daunted, 46 Rivkin and Block cite four judicial authori-
ties in their text: United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.;4
7
United States v. Nixon;48 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez;49
and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.50 They accurately
assert that it was in Curtiss-Wright where the Supreme Court ini-
tially lent its imprimatur to the broad presidential discretion in for-
eign policymaking. 1
A. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,52 the judicial cor-
nerstone of the Rivkin-Block theory of a bifurcated presidency, fur-
nished a powerful impetus to the expansion of presidential power.s3
The basis for subsequent decisions, it frequently is cited for a ple-
nary presidential authority over foreign relations.5' Later presidents
have bid to confirm Curtiss-Wright as an effective judicial amend-
ment of the Constitution's Article II, to add to the enumerated
powers therein an indeterminate reservoir of executive foreign af-
fairs authority.55 Curtiss-Wright crystallized the image of un-
checked executive discretion encompassing virtually the whole ar-
ray of foreign relations within inherent presidential authority.56 The
opinion is so frequently quoted as to be known as the "Curtiss-
Wright, so I'm right" citation. 57 The Curtiss-Wright image of poli-
cymaking repudiates the axiom of institutional powersharing and
participation.58
1975).
44. Lutz, supra note 36, at 196 (citing Lundberg & May, The Enlightened Reader in
America, 28 AM. Q. 262 (1976)).
45. Lutz, supra note 36, at 196.
46. Rivkin and Block thank Bradford A. Patrick of Colgate University for invaluable
aid in preparing their article, 'The Constitution in Danger': An Exchange, supra note 6, at
52, col. 2.
47. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304.
48. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
49. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056.
50. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
51. 'The Constitution in Danger': An Exchange, supra note 6, at 51, col. 3.
52. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304.
53. R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 110 (1974).
54. Id. at 100-101.
55. H. KOH, supra note 5, at 94.
56. Id. at 72.
57. Id. at 94; Cole, Book Review, 99 YALE L.J. 2063, 2082 (1990).
58. H. KOH, supra note 5, at 72.
(Val. 21
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In Curtiss-Wright, an indictment had been returned charging the
Curtiss-Wright appellees with conspiracy to sell arms to Bolivia in
violation of a Congressional Joint Resolution and of a Presidential
proclamation issued under authority conferred by that Resolution.59
Appellees had demurred on the ground that the Joint Resolution
represented an invalid delegation of legislative power to the execu-
tive,60 inasmuch as the Resolution's initial (and continuing) effect
was conditioned upon unfettered presidential discretion. 61
Justice Sutherland's opinion for seven Justices 2 emphasized that
in the vast international arena, with its sensitive and complex chal-
lenges, the President alone is authorized to speak as national repre-
sentative. a As would Rivkin and Block,64 Justice Sutherland quotes
Congressman John Marshall's argument of March 7, 1800, to the
House of Representatives: "The President is the sole organ of the
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with for-
eign nations." 65
Justice Sutherland found it crucial that the Court was dealing
not merely with an authority vested in the President by an exercise
of the legislative power, but with such an authority accompanied by
the plenary and exclusive power of the President as sole organ of
the federal government in the foreign policy field. 6 While this lat-
ter power must be utilized only consistently with the Constitution,
it does not require as a prerequisite to its exercise any congressional
enactment. 7 If the President is legislatively authorized to act re-
specting matters in a foreign land, Congress properly recalls that
the mode of the President's action (or whether the President acts at
all) hinges upon the President's confidential information, and upon
its effect on American foreign relations. 8 These considerations
demonstrate the folly of demanding that in the international policy
field Congress lay down narrowly defined standards whereby the
President is to be governed.69
59. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 311.
60. Id. at 314-15.
61. Id.
62. Justice McReynolds dissented, and Justice Stone took no part in the case. Id. at
333.
63. Id. at 319.
64. 'The Constitution in Danger': An Exchange, supra note 6, at 51, col. 2 (citing E.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1984, at 208 (5th rev. ed. 1984)).
65. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (citing Annals, 6th Cong., col. 613).
66. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-20.
67. Id. at 320.
68. Id. at 321.
69. Id. at 321-22.
1990)
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Holding the Curtiss-Wright Joint Resolution void as an unlawful
delegation of legislative power would have called into question a
multitude of comparable acts and resolutions enacted by virtually
every Congress since the First. 70 This uniform, long-continued, and
undisputed legislative practice flowing in a steady stream for a cen-
tury and a half evidences the constitutionality of the practice as a
matter of history, in addition to the practice's legitimacy as a ques-
tion, in principle, of the very nature of the President's foreign pol-
icy authority.71
B. United States v. Nixon
In United States v. Nixon,72 Chief Justice Burger's opinion (for a
unanimous eight Justices)73 recognized that, whatever the nature of
the confidentiality of presidential communications in the exercise of
the President's article II powers, privilege thereto derives from the
supremacy of each branch of the federal government within its own
sphere.74 With certain privileges flowing from the nature of enu-
merated powers, protection of the confidentiality of presidential
communications enjoys constitutional support.75
The Supreme Court held in Nixon that if the ground for assert-
ing privilege regarding subpoenaed materials sought for utilization
in a criminal trial is premised solely on a generalized interest in
confidentiality, that privilege yields to the fundamental demands of
the due process of law in fair administration of criminal justice.76
The Court rejected the notion that even the critical interest in the
confidentiality of presidential communications is diminished sub-
stantially by production of such material for in camera review, ab-
sent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or delicate na-
tional security secrets. 77
The Supreme Court observed that President Nixon had not pre-
mised his privilege claim upon the grounds of military or diplo-
matic secrets. 78 The judiciary traditionally has displayed the utmost
deference to presidential responsibilities in those reaches of the
70. Id. at 327.
71. Id. at 327-29.
72. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683.
73. Justice Rehnquist took no part in that opinion. Id. at 716.
74. Id. at 705.
75. Id. at 705-06.
76. Id. at 713.
77. Id. at 706.
78. Id. at 710.
[Vol. 21
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President's article II duties.79 The Nixon opinion concedes that the
need for confidentiality even as regards casual presidential chats
with associates, wherein references might be made concerning for-
eign statesmen, is too obvious to demand further elaboration."0 The
Nixon opinion thereby comports with the post-Curtiss-Wright ple-
nary presidential power in foreign policymaking, a power un-
checked by any judicially-enforced rule of law.
C. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the February 28, 1990, opinion for
the Supreme Court in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.8 ' The
question therein was whether the fourth amendment applies to the
search and seizure by U.S. agents of property owned by a nonresi-
dent alien 2 and located abroad.8 " The dissenting judge below,
Rehnquist observed,8 4 had argued that the statement in Curtiss-
Wright, that neither the Constitution nor laws passed in pursuance
thereof are of any force in foreign territory except in respect to
American citizens, 5 foreclosed any claim in Verdugo-Urquidez to
fourth amendment rights.8" Verdugo-Urquidez held the fourth
amendment inapplicable to the searches and seizures at issue
therein .87
Rehnquist added that applying the fourth amendment in
Verdugo-Urquidez would have a deep and deleterious impact on
U.S. activities outside our borders. Holding the fourth amendment
applicable would hamper not merely law enforcement operations
outside United States boundaries, but also other foreign policy un-
dertakings which might encompass searches or seizures. The
United States has employed its armed forces abroad more than 200
79. Id.
80. Id. at 715.
81. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990). Five Justices joined
in the Rehnquist opinion although Justice Kennedy, the fifth Justice, added his own concur-
ring opinion. Id. at 1066 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
82. "Renr6 Verdugo-Urquidez, a Mexican trafficker also accused by the [U.S.] DEA
[Drug Enforcement Administration] of participating in [D.E.A. agent Enrique] Camarena's
murder, was shoved through a border fence by Mexican authorities in 1986 to waiting drug
agents in Calexico, Calif." Hedges & Witkin, Kidnapping Drug Lords, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., May 14, 1990, at 28.
83. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1059.
84. Id. at 1060.
85. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318.
86. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1230-31 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Wallace, J., dissenting), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
87. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1059.
1990]
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times to protect its citizens or national security.88 Applying the
fourth amendment in such circumstances could substantially dis-
rupt the two political branches' capacity to respond to foreign situa-
tions touching the national interest. Aliens unattached to the
United States could launch actions for damages to remedy fourth
amendment violations in international waters or in foreign lands.8 9
Justice Rehnquist continued that, for better or worse, the United
States must function effectively in the world of sovereign nation-
states. Circumstances menacing major U.S. interests may erupt on
the far side of the globe, demanding the political branches reply
with military might.9 Any limits on searches and seizures arising
incidentally to such U.S. moves must be imposed by the two politi-
cal branches via diplomatic understandings, treaties, or
legislation."
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, defined the question
as what constitutional standards apply when the government acts,
in reference to an alien, within the sphere of foreign operations.9 2
Citing Curtiss-Wright, he determined that one must interpret con-
stitutional protections in light of the indisputable power of the
United States to take measures asserting its legitimate power and
authority overseas. 3
In short, Verdugo-Urquidez comports completely with a post-
Curtiss-Wright plenary presidential foreign policymaking power
unchecked by any judicially-enforced rule of law. Domestic
searches and seizures, at least by the states, are by contrast closely
regulated by the post-Carolene Products Supreme Court making
social policy unchecked by its two democratic partners in the fed-
eral government.
D. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
Rivkin and Block contend that the Curtiss-Wright analysis of ex-
ecutive prerogatives is sustained9" through Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 5 In Youngstown, the Supreme Court was
88. Id. at 1065.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1066.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1067 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
93. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)).
94. 'The Constitution in Danger': An Exchange, supra note 6, at 51, col. 3.
95. Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579.
[Vol. 21
10
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 1 [1990], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol21/iss1/4
A BIFURCATED PRESIDENCY
asked to decide whether President Harry S. Truman had acted
within his constitutional powers when he issued an order directing
Secretary of Commerce Sawyer to take possession of and operate
most of the country's steel mills.96 Justice Black's opinion for the
Court recognized that the President relied upon no statutory au-
thorization for his seizure. 7 Indeed, when the Taft-Hartley Act
had been considered in 1947, Congress rejected an amendment
which would have authorized such seizures in cases of emergency.9
The President instead argued that sufficient power inhered in the
aggregate of his constitutional powers,99 especially through the arti-
cle II vesting of executive power in the President,1 °" and its.require-
ments the President take care the laws be faithfully executed"0 and
that he be Commander in Chief.102 While Congress might enjoy
the powers claimed by President Truman,10 3 Justice Black's opinion
for the Court held the powers not to be vested in the President.0 '
The Black opinion for the Court underscores the deference of the
post-Jones & Laughlin Supreme Court to Congress in economic
policymaking (e.g., the Taft-Hartley Act).
Justice Jackson's famous' 05-if not classic'e1 -- concurring opin-
ion is now embraced by the full Court as a lodestone of separation
of powers jurisprudence. 10 7 It emphasized that if the President acts
pursuant to congressional authorization, his authority reaches its
zenith.108 Yet when the President moves contrary to the implied
will of Congress his authority touches its nadir.1 09 The steel seizure
fell within the latter category.11
Nonetheless, Jackson highlighted the deference of the post-Cur-
tiss-Wright Supreme Court to the President in foreign, or at least
in foreign and military, policymaking:
We should not use this occasion to circumscribe, much less to
96. Id. at 582.
97. Id. at 585.
98. Id. at 586 (citing 93 CONG. REC. 3637-3645).
99. Id. at 587.
100. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
101. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
102. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
103. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588.
104. Id.
105. H. KOH, supra note 5, at 72, 105.
106. Id. at 107.
107. Id. at 105.
108. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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contract, the lawful role of the President as Commander in Chief.
I should indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to sustain his
exclusive function to command the instruments of national force,
at least when turned against the outside world for the security of
our society. But, when it is turned inward, not because of rebel-
lion but because of a lawful economic struggle between industry
and labor, it should have no such indulgence.'
Each participating Justice plainly recognized the external impli-
cations of the Youngstown opinion. 1 '
Justice Burton's concurring opinion also was closely keyed to the
Taft-Hartley Act: "For the purposes of this case the most signifi-
cant feature of that Act is its omission of authority to seize an af-
fected industry." 14  This background distinguishes Truman's
seizure emergency from one wherein Congress had outlined no
policy: 1 5
The controlling fact here is that Congress, within its constitution-
ally delegated power, has prescribed for the President specific
procedures, exclusive of seizure, for his use in meeting the present
type of emergency. Congress has reserved to itself the right to
determine where and when to authorize the seizure of property in
meeting such an emergency. Under these circumstances, the Pres-
ident's order . . . invaded the jurisdiction of Congress. It violated
the essence of the principle of the separation of governmental
powers. Accordingly, the injunction against its effectiveness
should be sustained.116
Justice Burton does not so much challenge an unchecked post-Cur-
tiss-Wright presidential power in foreign policymaking as vindicate
the post-Jones & Laughlin unchecked congressional power in eco-
nomic policymaking.
Justice Clark likewise concluded that President Truman's steel
seizure was unsustainable because the President had failed to fol-
low congressionally-prescribed methods to meet the steel crisis.""
Justice Douglas concurred that Truman's move was of a clearly
legislative nature:" 8 "We could not sanction the seizures and con-
demnations of the steel plants in this case without reading article II
111. Id. at 645 (Jackson, J., concurring).
112. H. KOH, supra note 5, at 107.
113. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 656 (Burton, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 657 (Burton, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 659 (Burton, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 660 (Burton, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 630 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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as giving the President not only the power to execute the laws but
to make some." 1 9
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence recollected the close connec-
tion between the separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances.1 2 Frankfurter reviewed the Taft-Hartley Act 2' with a
respectful acknowledgement of congressional authority: "It cannot
be contended that the President would have had power to issue this
order had Congress explicitly negated such authority in formal leg-
islation." '22 Frankfurter climaxed his concurrence recognizing that
the Supreme Court was not so much defying the President as refe-
reeing between the President and Congress: "In reaching the con-
clusion that conscience compels, I too derive consolation from the
reflection that the President and the Congress between them will
continue to safeguard the heritage which comes to them straight
from George Washington.' 23
The teaching of Youngstown, as the Clark, Douglas and Frank-
furter concurrences reaffirm, is not denial of a post-Curtiss-Wright
unchecked presidential foreign policymaking. The teaching of
Youngstown as reaffirmed by these three concurrences, rather, vin-
dicates the post-Jones & Laughlin unchecked congressional power
in economic policymaking.
III. CONTEMPORARY PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICYMAKING
Today, numerous members of both the executive branch and
Congress invoke a vision of the Constitution whereby virtually the
entire range of foreign affairs falls exclusively within the presiden-
tial domain, devoid of the meaningful participation of either Con-
gress or the judiciary. 24 The President's men have exploited the
vision of unchecked discretion to override the crucial premise of
shared power.1 5
The President has appeared almost always to win in foreign af-
fairs because Congress ordinarily has acquiesced in what the presi-
dent has wrought, through legislative shortsightedness, inadequate
drafting, ineffective legislative tools, or plain want of political will
119. Id. at 633 (Douglas, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 598-602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 614 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
124. H. KoH, supra note 5, at 5.
125. Id.
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on the part of that second branch of the federal government.12 6 He
likewise has triumphed because the federal judiciary usually has
tolerated his efforts either by declining to hear challenges to his
acts, or by hearing those challenges and then on the merits af-
firming his authority 7
Through recent decades the President prevails under practically
every scenario. If the executive branch possesses statutory or consti-
tutional authority to act and Congress acquiesces, he wins.1 28
Should Congress not acquiesce, but lack the political will to cut off
appropriations or to pass an objecting statute and override a veto,
again the Chief Executive prevails. Should a private individual or a
member of Congress sue to challenge the President's action, the
judiciary probably will decline to adjudicate that challenge on the
ground that the plaintiff lacks standing; the question is not ripe, or
is moot, or political; the defendant is immune; or that relief is inap-
propriate.1 29 And even if the plaintiffs somehow overcome each of
these obstacles and persuade the courts to hear their challenge on
the merits, the judiciary usually will rule in favor of the
President. 3 '
Particularly since the Indochina War, the judiciary has re-
nounced policing the boundaries of executive-congressional author-
ity over national security affairs. The courts instead have adopted a
broad deference in foreign affairs to the executive, a deference aris-
ing as much from a complicated meld of cowardice and confusion
as from legitimate concerns over competence and the Constitu-
126. Id. at 5, 117.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 135; 148.
129. Id. Although the judiciary renounced policing the bounds of executive-congres-
sional authority regarding national security, it simultaneously increased the reach of courts
into American life by regarding a wider array of matters subject to judicial resolution:
Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has relaxed the rules governing justiciability-
the conditions under which courts will hear a case-to greatly increase the range of
issues with which the federal judiciary can deal. For example, the Court has liberal-
ized the doctrine of standing to permit taxpayers' suits where First Amendment
issues are involved. The Court has amended the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
facilitate class-action suits. Claims that might have been rejected as de minimis if
asserted individually can now be aggregated against a common defendant. The Su-
preme Court has also effectively rescinded the abstention doctrine, which had called
for federal judges to decline to hear cases that rested on questions of state law not
yet resolved by the state courts. The Supreme Court has relaxed the rules governing
determinations of mootness and, for all intents and purposes, has done away with
the political questions doctrine, which had functioned as a limit on judicial activism.
B. GINSBERG & M. SHEFTER, supra note 30, at 149-50.
130. H. Koii, supra note 5, at 135, 148.
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tion."' Under the War Powers Act of 1973,111 courts have, inexpli-
cably on the surface, asserted judicial incompetence or separation
of powers rationales for failing to determine whether hostilities ex-
ist for the purpose of triggering it."' Simultaneously with the judi-
cial abstention from deciding whether the American government
and officials have broken international law and the constitutional
law of foreign relations, they regularly have passed judgment on
whether foreign government officials have broken international and
domestic law-especially in transnational commercial and human
rights cases under the Act of State Doctrine, the Alien Tort Stat-
ute, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.13 1
Congress meanwhile shrinks from redressing the executive-legis-
lative imbalance in foreign policyrnaking by more effectively wield-
ing its appropriations power."" Congress could, at an earlier junc-
ture during the appropriations process, demand greater executive
accountability. That juncture is when Congress authorizes those
programs to later consume appropriations.3 6
Congress simultaneously shrinks from more liberally unleashing
its impeachment power against executive officers. 137 The Constitu-
tion empowers the House to impeach, and the Senate to try, not
only the President and Vice-President, but all civil officers of the
United States for high crimes and misdemeanors." 8 The President
lacks the constitutional power to pardon those who have undergone
impeachment. 39
If Congress was to enact a framework statute geared to regulate
and protect many facets of the foreign policymaking process, " it
could declare that violations of key provisions must constitute high
crimes and misdemeanors warranting impeachment and removal
from office."" This impeachment remedy was constitutionally
designed to be exercised by Congress against executive subversion
of constitutionally mandated processes. "  Since judgment of im-
131. Id. at 204-05. Cf. L. HENKIN, supra note 39, at 2, 70, 79, 80-81, and 104.
132. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1983).
133. H. KOH, supra note 5, at 192.
134. Id. at 193.
135. Id. at 176.
136. Id. at 178.
137. Id. at 176.
138. U.S. CONST. art II, § 4.
139. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
140. An idea for such a statute was developed only last year. H. KOH, supra note 5, at
157-58.
141. Id. at 180.
142. Id.
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peachment constitutionally reaches no further than removal from
office and disqualification to exercise any office under the United
States, 143 Congress could pursue its constitutionally authorized
remedy of removal from office without prejudice to any subsequent
criminal investigation."
Yet all of the foregoing delineates the functional scope of presi-
dential foreign policymaking. What are the policymaking functions
assigned to the two remaining contemporary branches of the cen-
tral government?
IV. THE CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL DIVISION OF LABOR
The Supreme Court's April 4, 1937, opinion in Jones & Laugh-
lin signalled the capitulation of the federal judiciary to the Presi-
dent and Congress in the face of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
February 5, 1937, 45 threat to pack the Supreme Court. 46 On May
18, 1937, Justice Van Devanter announced his retirement opening
the way for a pro-New Deal Supreme Court majority and under-
cutting the court-packing bid.' 47 To preserve its structural integrity,
the Supreme Court retreated from substantive economic poli-
cymaking.' 48 Between 1937 and 1941 the Supreme Court upheld
broad federal exploitation of the commerce and taxation powers,149
as was vividly underscored in its famous 1941 opinion in United
States v. Darby.5 '
But in Justice Stone's renowned footnote four in Carolene Prod-
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cls. 6-7.
144. H. KOH, supra note 5, at 180. But recognize that Professor Koh is, like any mor-
tal, a less than perfect guide to the Constitution. He thinks: "Precisely because federal
judges enjoy life tenure and salary independence and owe nothing to those who appointed
them, it is their business to say what the law is in foreign affairs." Id. at 224 (emphasis in
original). Although he writes of impeachment, Koh is unaware that the Constitution com-
mands: "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour .. " U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Federal judges are, as Edward Keynes
recalled two years ago, impeachable on any ground Congress likes. E. KEYNES & R. MILLER,
THE COURT VS. CONGRESS: PRAYER, BUSING, AND ABORTION 305 (1989). On the other hand,
Koh is not greatly to be censured. Keynes' co-author made Koh's very error in Keynes' own
treatise, even anticipating Koh's misguided phrase. Id. at 232 ("life-tenure"). And "at com-
mon law 'life tenure' itself was conditioned on 'good behavior' and was determined by the
grantee's misbehavior." R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 126
(1973).
145. Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR's Court-Packing
Plan, 81 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1139, 1141 (1987).
146. Id. at 1142.
147. Id. at 1142, 1148-49.
148. Id. at 1150.
149. E. KEYNES & R. MILLER, supra note 144, at 168.
150. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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ucts, the Supreme Court (presuming the validity of economic legis-
lation) moved toward a more searching inquiry into legislation in-
fringing fundamental rights or impairing a minority's access to the
political process. 1 5  The outlines of the revised Supreme Court
strategy had formed by 1948. In Hague v. CIO 52 during 1939, the
Supreme Court initially held the first amendment's freedom of peti-
tion clause applicable to the states; in Cantwell v. Connecticut 53
during 1940, the Supreme Court initially held the first amend-
ment's free exercise of religion clause applicable to the states; in
Skinner v. Oklahoma 54 during 1942, the Supreme Court prevented
the state sterilization of a felon; in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette'55 during 1943, the Supreme Court held that
public school children could not be compelled to salute the flag in
violation of their religious beliefs; in Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo'
during 1944, it interpreted a presidential executive order so as to
curtail the government power to detain innocent Japanese-Ameri-
cans following their evacuation and the evaluation of their loyalty;
in Smith v. Allwright'57 during 1944, it ruled that a white primary
violated the fifteenth amendment; in Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion 5 8 during 1947, the Supreme Court initially held the first
amendment's free exercise of religion clause applied to the states;
in In re Oliver'5 9 during 1948, the Supreme Court initially held the
sixth amendment right to a public trial applicable to the states; and
in Shelley v. Kraemer,16 0 also during 1948, it found state enforce-
ment of a discriminatory housing deed or covenant violated the
guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.
This decade through 1948 inaugurated the struggle within the
Supreme Court between two late-1930s Roosevelt appointees to
that Court who would serve together for twenty-three years. 61
151. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. The post-1938 Supreme Court-Congress
division of labor was anticipated by Justice Holmes in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (assigning economic policymaking to politicians, albeit
therein state, not federal, politicians), overruled, Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342
U.S. 421 (1952), and Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing) (assigning social policymaking in the states to the federal judiciary).
152. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
153. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
154. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
155. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
156. Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
157. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
158. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
159. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
160. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
161. J. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL
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Roosevelt's first appointee, (who as U.S. Senator had supported the
courtpacking scheme) Justice Black, led the activist wing, insisting
that the Justices had a special obligation to protect minority rights.
Justice Frankfurter became the Court's most prominent exponent
of the judicial restraint philosophy." 2 (Strikingly, it is in the face
of this post-Carolene Products (1938) judicial history through 1948
that the 1990-1991 President of the American Political Science As-
sociation, James Collins Professor of Management and Public Pol-
icy at the University of California at Los Angeles James Q. Wilson,
last year declared: "Though the Supreme Court abandoned its
early opposition to new federal initiatives, it did not take initiatives
of its own, in the 1930s or 1940s, by discovering new rights or pro-
viding new grounds for citizen action against the state. '163)
Observe that Hague, Cantwell, Skinner, Barnette, Allwright, Ev-
erson, Oliver, and Shelley all represent Supreme Court social poli-
cymaking over the states; and Endo does not constitutionally chal-
lenge wartime presidential powers. Instead Endo interprets an
executive order of President Roosevelt to evade any such constitu-
tional challenge.
The years 1936, 1937, and 1938, producing respectively the opin-
ions of Curtiss-Wright, Jones & Laughlin, and Carolene Products,
established the unchecked policymaking in their respective foreign,
economic, and social spheres by the federal executive, legislature
and judiciary. Indeed, because most constitutional law casebooks
open their discussion of the foreign relations authority with either
Curtiss-Wright or Youngstown, newcomers to the topic might con-
clude that the issue of plenary presidential power in foreign poli-
cymaking first emerged in 1936.164 This establishment defines the
division of labor between the three branches of a federal govern-
ment wielding power wholly unchecked by any judicially-enforced
rule of law.
This timetable coincides with the considerable extension in the
use of the executive agreement since 1933, and the employment of
executive agreements for purposes contemplated by neither states-
LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA 9-10 (1989).
162. Id. at 10.
163. Wilson, The Newer Deal, The New Republic, July 2, 1990, at 34, 35. Professor
Wilson's error is the more salient considering that Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947), marked the peak of support within the Supreme Court of Justice Black's theory that
the Bill of Rights had been incorporated wholesale into the fourteenth amendment. F. GRA-
HAM, THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION 44 (1970). The functionalist logic of selective incorpo-
ration is explicated in Swan, supra note 32, at 823-25.
164. H. KOH, supra note 5, at 72.
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men nor writers prior to 1930.165 During the nineteenth century the
United States entered approximately three treaties and one execu-
tive agreement annually.1 66 Those figures waxed to twelve and
twelve respectively by the historic year 1933.167 Although the an-
nual average of treaties remained at 12 thereafter, the number of
agreements swelled to almost 183 yearly. 6 ' The Supreme Court
largely vindicated presidential exploitation of the executive agree-
ment."6 9 Not coincidentally, the Curtiss-Wright opinion of 1936
forcefully contributed to the activist presidency model fostered by
Franklin Roosevelt.170
This timetable likewise coincides with the post-1934 swelling
stream of judicial inclusions of the Bill of Rights into the four-
teenth amendment.' 7 ' This timetable also coincides with the emer-
gence, since the Supreme Court's opinion during 1935 in
Humphrey's Executor v. United States,'72 of the federal adminis-
trative agencies as a politically unaccountable fourth branch of the
central government .'7  This timetable similarly coincides with the
Supreme Court's well-known pronouncement in Darby that the
states rights amendment 17 declares but "a truism."' 75
Without any constitutional amendment whatsoever, the Constitu-
tion was dramatically revised between the March 4, 1933, inaugu-
ration of that President who openly threatened to solicit power "as
great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact
165. Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54 YALE UJ. 616, 649
(1945).
166. H. KOH, supra note 5, at 41.
167. Id. at 41-42.
168. Id. at 42.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 135. Cf. id. at 197. "Since the administration of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, . . . the executive has launched an effort to undermine the principle of shared
power by openly asserting and covertly exercising unilateral foreign policy authority." Cole,
supra note 57, at 2065. "Roosevelt never overlooked the fact that his actions might lead to
his immediate or eventual impeachment." R. SHERWOOD, ROOSEVELT AND HOPKINS: AN
INTIMATE HISTORY 274 (1948). Only last year, Senator Moynihan recalled President
Roosevelt's 1940 destroyer-naval base deal as wholly improper under the Neutrality Act of
1917, and clearly an impeachable offense. D. MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 71-72
(1990). Cf Burlingham, Thacher, Rubles & Acheson, infra note 223.
171. Swan, The Political Economy of Supreme Court Social Policymaking 1987, 8
ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 87, 117 (1989).
172. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
173. Swan, supra note 32, at 827-28. "Separation of powers and checks and balances
have been reshaped by the emergence of the administrative state and the administrative
'fourth branch' of government." L. HENKIN, supra note 39, at 14.
174. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
175. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
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invaded by a foreign foe,"'1 76 and the April 4, 1937, Jones &
Laughlin surrender by the embattled Supreme Court. No longer
engaged in its constitutional duty of protecting the people and the
states by checking (and so balancing) those two creatures of the
people in their states (the President and Congress), the Supreme
Court since 1938 instead has made national social policy by check-
ing the people in their states. The incorporation doctrine, for exam-
ple, primarily represents federal judicial policymaking over the
states (witness the progeny of Cantwell and Everson).
V. THE FEDERAL BRANCHES' MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT VIA
DIVISION OF LABOR
A. Koh on Shared Foreign Policymaking
In his fine 1990 treatise,177 Professor Koh explains Justice Jack-
son's opinion in Youngstown as affording the structural vision of a
foreign affairs power shared through balanced institutional partici-
pation 178 of Congress, the courts and executive. 79 This he styles a
counterimage to Curtiss-Wright. s0 Koh is displeased that the ple-
nary presidential authority principle identified with Curtiss-Wright
not only survived Youngstown, but nowadays revitalizes itself in its
second half-century of existence.' 8 '
Koh recounts that during the Warren Court years (1953-1969)
immediately following the Youngstown decision of 1952, the
Youngstown theory of a balanced participation in foreign affairs' 82
took a strong hold. 18 3 The Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961)1"
176. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), reprinted in 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS
AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 11, 15 (1937).
I am prepared under my constitutional duty to recommend the measures that a
stricken Nation in the midst of a stricken world may require. These measures, or
such other measures as the Congress may build out of its experience and wisdom, I
shall seek, within my constitutional authority, to bring to speedy adoption.
But in the event that the Congress shall fail to take one of these two courses, and in
the event that the national emergency is still critical, I shall not evade the clear
course of duty that will then confront me. I shall ask the Congress for the one
remaining instrument to meet the crisis - broad Executive power to wage a war
against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were
in fact invaded by a foreign foe.
Id.
177. H. KOH, supra note 5.
178. Id. at 72, 112.
179. Id. at 105.
180. Id. at 72, 108, 112-13.
181. Id. at 134-35.
182. Id. at 72, 112.
183. Id. at 136.
184. The Eisenhower administration, especially, appeared aware that the means of
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and John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) administrations provoked com-
paratively few foreign affairs conflicts with Congress. 8 5 Most of
the foreign affairs disputes that came before the Supreme Court
during this period involved allegations that government conduct
had infringed upon individual rights, rather than interbranch con-
flicts. Therein the Warren Court carefully scrutinized those statutes
cited by the executive not merely for signs of legislative consent to
presidential action, but to ascertain whether Congress and the Pres-
ident acting jointly had entrenched upon constitutionally protected
rights. 18 6
But since the Pentagon Papers187 case of 1971, the Curtiss-
Wright vision of executive foreign affairs supremacy reemerged 188
triumphantly. 8 ' It resurfaced not so much in constitutional inter-
pretation as in the statutory construction realm.'90 Koh finds the
Burger and Rehnquist courts have rejected virtually all doctrinal
devices put forward to narrow the substantive scope of executive
power.'
Urged to apply the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a grant
of power to the president, the Supreme Court declared in Zemel v.
Rusk '9 that the doctrine did not apply equally to foreign affairs;
193
asked to construe the existence of a statute in the field to preclude
any claim of inherent presidential foreign policymaking power, the
Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan"' refused. 95 Even
when solicited to read narrowly the sweep of a statute impinging on
meeting foreign crises properly may neither be undeclared presidential warfare nor declared
war, but congressional authorization to the President to use the armed forces. R. BERGER,
supra note 53, at 80-81; L. HENKIN, supra note 39, at 39. Unfortunately, this approach risks
passing the President a lighted match to ignite foreign wars. S. AMBROSE, 2 EISENHOWER
234-35 (1984) (January 28, 1955, Formosa Strait Resolution). Eisenhower himself said he
requested the Formosa Strait Resolution "to give the President unlimited authority to act in
the Formosa Strait." D. EISENHOWER, MANDATE FOR CHANGE 468 (1963). Some members
of Congress feared the comparable Middle East Resolution of March 9, 1957, "would confer
on the President constitutional authority belonging to the Legislative branch." D. EISEN-
HOWER, WAGING PEACE 180 (1965).
185. H. KOH, supra note 5, at 136.
186. Id.
187. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Swan, supra note
27, at 395-96.
188. H. KoH, supra note 5, at 137.
189. Id. at 146.
190. Id. at 137, 144.
191. Id. at 146.
192. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
193. Id. at 17.
194. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
195. id. at 684-86.
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constitutional rights, the Supreme Court in Regan v. Wald, 9 ' Haig
v. Agee,19 7 and Snepp v. United States,'9 8 has refused, as Koh re-
counts, to apply the "clear statement" rule; urged to uphold as con-
stitutional a congressional control device, the Supreme Court in
INS v. Chadhal9" and Bowsher v. Synar2 00 has invalidated it.
2 1
Yet Professor Koh misconstrues his historical evidence. That the
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations picked few foreign policy
scraps with Congress is, at best, simply negative evidence. It does
not disprove a continuing post-Curtiss-Wright plenary presidential
power in foreign policymaking. While the Eisenhower administra-
tion assuredly displayed some restraint (that soldier-President feel-
ing no compulsion to publicly prove himself in foreign confronta-
tions), President Kennedy's 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis reminded
America of how much her fate depended upon the fallible choices
of one man.20 2
More significantly, Koh recognizes that most of the foreign af-
fairs disputes before the Warren Court were not about interbranch
refereeing, wherein the continuing sway of Curtiss-Wright more
readily could be measured, but concerned government infringe-
ments upon individuals' constitutional rights. This means their ten-
dency was less about foreign policymaking than about social poli-
cymaking. This is precisely the field assigned the federal judiciary
by the post-Carolene Products federal interbranch division of labor.
Professor Koh's (assuredly brief) review of the Warren Court
years less demonstrates temporary eclipse of post-Curtiss-Wright
plenary presidential authority in foreign relations by a Youngstown
theory of interbranch partnership, than demonstrates that the
196. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 240-42 (1984).
197. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
198. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
199. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
200. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Swan, supra note 32.
201. H. KOH, supra note 5, at 146, 296 n.45.
202. "In 1962, John F. Kennedy stood up to Castro and Moscow and blocked the
establishment on Cuban soil of a Soviet missile base capable of hurling nuclear weapons at
the United States." R. REAGAN, AN AMERICAN LIFE 472 (1990). "The 1962 accord is valid
and lawful, because President Kennedy was within his rights to declare the United States
policy." Swan, The 1962 Cuban Missile Agreement: Status and Prospects upon Its Second
Quarter-Century, 11 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 391, 415 (1988). That 1988 study
awaited "the yet-unwritten memoirs of Kennedy's Secretary of State Dean Rusk." Id. at
411. Rusk only last year hailed Kennedy's ability to remain "cool" in that October 1962
crisis. D. RUSK, AS TOLD TO R. RUSK, As I SAW IT 232 (1990). Soviet Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko, who conferred with Kennedy on October 18, recalled him as "nervous." A.
GROMYKO, MEMOIRS 178 (1990), but praised him as a statesman of intelligence and integ-
rity. Id. at 179.
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1953-1969 Warren Court too perceived a post-Curtiss-Wright/
Jones & Laughlin/Carolene Products division of labor.
Before 1970, the judiciary simply declared the whole issue of the
Indochina War nonjusticiable." 3 In fact, just four votes in Regan v.
Wald"°4 is the closest the Supreme Court has come to invalidating
executive action in foreign affairs since Youngstown."0 5 Except for
Youngstown itself, the modern-day record of the judiciary in chal-
lenging foreign affairs activities is a disaster.2 °0
Professor Lino Gralia asserts that, regarding the nature of soci-
ety and quality of life, the Supreme Court meanwhile is the coun-
try's principal policymaking body.2"7 He feels the turning point 0 8
was the Warren Court's 1954 opinion in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.209 The Block and Rivkin theory of a bifurcated presidency
post-Curtiss-Wright is sustained through the jurisprudence of the
Warren Court.
B. The Federal Branches Reinforce One Another
1. The Unchecked Power of the President. Article IX of the Ar-
ticles of Confederation provided: "The United States in Congress
assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of de-
termining on peace and war. .... 210 This, of course, corresponds
to Article I of our 1787 Constitution.2"' But it has been suggested
that this assignment of authority has proved a futile effort. Never
before then had a legislative branch held the declaration of war
authority.212
The President, as Commander in Chief, can today unilaterally
enter undeclared foreign wars even without Congressional resolu-
tion (Korea, 1950); wars actually entered in stealth 213 (North At-
203. Cole, supra note 57, at 2083 (citing Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F. 2d 664 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967); United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511 (D.
Mass. 1968)).
204. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
205. Cole, supra note 57, at 2086 n.105.
206. Id. at 2085.
207. Graglia, A Theory of Power, NAT'L REV., July 17, 1987, at 33, 34.
208. Graglia, The Brown Cases Revisited: Where Are They Now?, BENCHMARK,
Mar.-Apr., 1984, at 23, 24.
209. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
210. Arts. of Confederation art. IX.
211. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.
212. Cole, supra note 57, at 2075 (citing C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION 480-81 (1928)). "Above all, the President was not to have the King's power to go to
war; that power was given to Congress." L. HENKIN, supra note 39, at 25.
213. In April 1941, President Roosevelt cabled British Prime Minister Churchill:
We propose immediately to take the following steps in relation to the security of the
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lantic, 1941); or merely waged by clandestine tactics (Cambodia,
1969); against a solemn treaty partner" 4 (Panama, 1989); after his
reelection campaign promising peace (North Atlantic, 1 5 1941; In-
dochina, 216  1965); with American regulars (Santo Domingo,217
1965; Grenada, 1983); or by proxy (Guatemala,21 8 1954; Cuba,219
Western Hemisphere, which steps will favorably affect your shipping problem. It is
important for domestic political reasons which you will readily understand that this
action be taken by us unilaterally and not after diplomatic conversations between
you and us. Therefore before taking this unilateral action I want to tell you about
the proposal.
This Government proposes to extend the present so-called security zone and patrol
areas which have been in effect since very early in the war to a line covering all
North Atlantic waters west of about west longitude 25 degrees. We propose to util-
ize aircraft and naval vessels working from Greenland, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia,
the United States, Bermuda, and West Indies, with possible later extension to Brazil
if this can be arranged. We will want in great secrecy notification of movement of
convoys so our patrol units can seek out any ships or planes of aggressor nations
operating west of the new line of the security zone.
ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL: THEIR SECRET WARTIME CORRESPONDENCE 137 (F.
Loewenheim, H. Langley & M. Jonas eds. 1975). See infra note 215.
214. Panama (on March 22, 1951) and the U.S. (on June 19, 1951) both ratified the
Charter of the Organization of American States. P. ROHN, 2 WORLD TREATY ANNEX 488
(2d ed. 1983). This Charter provides that "no State ... has the right to intervene, directly,
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State."
Charter of the Organization of American States, art. 18. Theodore Draper reports that the
government of Panama attacked and overthrown in December 1989 had not, after all, de-
clared war on the U.S. Draper, Did Noriega Declare War?, N.Y. Rev. Books, Mar. 29,
1990, at 13.
215. President Roosevelt promised in his October 30, 1940, Boston Arena speech:
"And while I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have
said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be
sent into any foreign wars." R. SHERWOOD, supra note 170, at 191. See supra note 213.
216. "I thought the best answer to Goldwater's repeated suggestions that we consider
using 'tactical' nuclear weapons on the battlefield was my relentless search for detente with
the Soviet Union and my insistence on restraint in Vietnam." L. JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE
POINT: PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1963-1969, at 102 (1971).
217. Duke University Professor of Law and Director of the Rule of Law Research
Center, Arthur J. Larson protested: "[T]here has not to this day been even an attempt to
explain a possible legal justification for the Dominican intervention." A. LARSON, EISEN-
HOWER: THE PRESIDENT NOBODY KNEW 122 (1968).
218. P. GLEIJESES, SHATTERED HOPE: THE GUATAMALAN REVOLUTION AND THE
UNITED STATES 1944-1954 (1991); S. SCHLESINGER, BITTER FRUIT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
THE AMERICAN COUP IN GUATEMALA (1982).
219. A. LARSON, supra note 217, at 119.
The Bay of Pigs invasion was a grotesque violation of both international and domes-
tic law. In the detailed accounts that promptly emerged after this fiasco, relating the
discussions that went on behind closed doors between President Kennedy and his
advisers prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion, the question whether the whole thing was
illegal was mentioned only once and quickly dismissed. Every other consideration
was elaborately argued and weighed-the military, the political, the psychological,
the diplomatic-and on balance apparently the invasion was thought to be a good
thing. How much simpler it would have been merely to say: we can't do this because
it is clearly illegal. If the cynic is inclined to dismiss this as oversimplified or senti-
mental, let him face the pragmatic test of the end result.
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1961; Nicaragua, 1981); with the blessing of the United Nations
(Persian Gulf, 1990); or in the face of an International Court of
Justice opinion that the war is illegal 2 0 (Nicaragua, 1986); for the
unconditional defeat of a targeted regime (Panama, 1989); or for
the mere status quo antebellum 2 ' (Korea, 1950); reinforcing a
friendly regime (Vietnam, 1965); or throttling a contrary one (Gre-
nada, 1983).
Senator Alexander Smith suggested to President Truman, shortly
after American entry into the Korean War, that Truman recom-
mend to Congress a resolution approving entry into those hostili-
ties.222 Secretary of State Dean Acheson disagreed, because Con-
gress could "keep debating and delaying a resolution so as to dilute
much of its public effect."22 3 Also, "Congressional hearings on a
resolution of approval at such a time, opening the possibility of end-
less criticism, would hardly be calculated to support the shaken mo-
rale of the troops or the unity that, for the moment, prevailed at
home."224  Parliaments impede kings. What need, then, for
parliaments?
The post-1936 exercise of presidential power tends to exploit a
military-industrial complex which, coincidentally, sprouted almost
immediately post- Curtiss-Wright (the military-industrial com-
plex22 5 being then christened the arsenal of democracy).226 Its in-
220. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nic. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 146 (Judgment of June 27, 1986). Subsequently, a United Na-
tions General Assembly resolution called for full and immediate compliance with this judg-
ment. G.A. Res 41/31, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 23, 24, U.N. Doc. A/41/53
(1986).
221. "Brigadier General John Church, who had been sent to Korea by General Mac-
Arthur to report the situation, had signaled that the status quo ante could not be restored
without the commitment of United States troops .... D. ACHESON. PRESENT AT THE CREA-
TION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT 411 (1969). "From the very start of hostilities
in Korea, President Truman intended to fight a limited engagement there." Id. at 416.
222. Id. at 413.
223. Id. at 414. Acheson, a lawyer, had been likewise dismissive of congressional input
into President Roosevelt's 1940 transfer of destroyers to Britain. Burlingham, Thacher, Ru-
bles & Acheson, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1940, at 8, col. 5 to 9, col. 6.
Admittedly, Acheson and his distinguished co-authors of this lengthy legal opinion added:
"Whatever might be our views on the law, we would not suggest executive action without
Congressional approval if we believed that a majority of the Congress was opposed to such
action." Id. col. 5.
224. D. ACHESON, supra note 221, at 415. "Congress appropriated money for the con-
duct of the war without questioning the President's authority." L. HENKIN, supra note 39, at
28.
225. "In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwar-
ranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The poten-
tial for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist." D. EISENHOWER,
supra note 184, at 616. Compare the reference to "defense experts," in Roosevelt, infra note
226.
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ternal dynamic was comprehended as early as 1919 by an expert,
President Woodrow Wilson, the greatest military interventionist in
American history:"2 7
You cannot handle an armed nation by vote. You cannot handle
an armed nation if it is democratic, because democracies do not
go to war that way. You have got to have a concentrated, milita-
ristic organization of government to run a nation of that sort. You
have got to think of the President of the United States, not as the
chief counsellor of the Nation, elected for a little while, but as the
man meant constantly and every day to be the Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, ready to order
them to any part of the world where the threat of war is a menace
to his own people. And you cannot do that under free debate. You
cannot do that under public counsel. Plans must be kept secret.2 28
This mankilling post-1936 exercise of presidential power is
226. As planes and ships and guns and shells are produced, your Government,
with its defense experts, can then determine how best to use them to defend this
hemisphere. The decision as to how much shall be sent abroad and how much shall
remain at home must be made on the basis of our over-all military necessities. We
must be the great arsenal of democracy. For us this is an emergency as serious as
war itself. We must apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same
sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and sacrifice as we would show were
we at war.
Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on National Security. White House, Washington, D.C. (December
29, 1940), reprinted in 9 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
633, 643 (1969). Compare the "unwarranted influence" within "councils of government" in
D. EISENHOWER, supra note 225.
227. H. KOH, supra note 5, at 90 (citing W. LAFEBER, THE AMERICAN AGE 261
(1989)). President Wilson intervened militarily in Russia, Mexico, Haiti, Santo Domingo,
Cuba, etc. H. KOH, supra note 5, at 90.
228. Wilson, Address Delivered on Western Tour: At Coliseum, St. Louis, Missouri
(September 5, 1919), reprinted in WAR AND PEACE: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES, ADDRESSES,
AND PUBLIC PAPERS (1917-1924) 634, 638-39 (1927). Wilson spoke only with the wisdom of
hindsight, not of prophetic foresight. He threatened that were the U.S. to remain outside the
League of Nations, the League's members would transform the League into an anti-Ameri-
can military alliance forcing America into a garrison state:
I am telling you the things, the evidence of which I have seen with awakened eyes
and not with sleeping eyes, and I know that this country, if it wishes to stand alone,
must stand alone as part of a world in arms. Because, ladies and gentlemen - I do
not say it because I am an American and my heart is full of the same pride that fills
yours with regard to the power and spirit of this great Nation, but merely because it
is a fact which I think everybody would admit, outside of America, as well as inside
of America - the organization contemplated by the League of Nations without the
United States would merely be an alliance and not a league of nations. It would be
an alliance in which the partnership would be between the more powerful European
nations and Japan, and the other party to the world arrangement, the antagonist,
the disassociated party, the party standing off to be watched by the alliance, would
be the United States of America.
Id. at 639-40. Sure enough, the post-Curtiss- Wright U.S. garrison state had arrived by 1940-
1941 (under a four-term President not "elected for a little while"), although not from fear of
a bellicose League but upon the failures of the League altogether.
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hardly checked by Congress. The Senate during 1969 adopted the
nonbinding National Commitments Resolution:
Resolved, That (1) a national commitment for the purpose of this
resolution means the use of the armed forces of the United States
on foreign territory, or a promise to assist a foreign country, gov-
ernment, or people by the use of the armed forces or financial
resources of the United States, either immediately or upon the
happening of certain events, and (2) it is the sense of the Senate
that a national commitment by the United States results only
from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative
branches of the United States Government by means of a treaty,
statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress spe-
cifically providing for such commitment.220
No President has accepted, openly, even this restriction."'
Congress repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964231 with an
unobtrusive, solitary sentence in an amendment to the Foreign Mil-
itary Sales Act.232 This sentence is tucked between the definitions
of "defense article," "excess defense articles," and "foreign coun-
try," and a prohibition on the transport of chemical munitions from
Okinawa to the United States.233 It conspicuously failed to correct
the earlier presidential interpretation of the resolution, disapprove
continued combat, or direct the termination of Indochina
warfare.2 34
Pitifully, Congress in the War Powers Act 235 has expressly di-
229. S. Res. 85, 91st. Cong., 1st. Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 17,245 (1969).
230. L. HENKIN, supra note 39, at 58.
231. H.R.J. Res. 1145, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Stat. 384 (1964). Former President
Johnson referred to "the Southeast Asia Resolution (often miscalled the 'Gulf of Tonkin'
Resolution) .... L. JOHNSON, supra note 216, at 117-18.
232. PUB. L. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053 (1971).
233. Id. at §§ 11, 13.
234. Ratner, The Coordinated Warmaking Power-Legislative, Executive, and Judi-
cial Roles, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 461, 474 (1971).
235. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a) (1983).
Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations
wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not
be inferred -
(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before November 7, 1973),
including any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision
specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostili-
ties or into such situations and states that it is intended to constitute specific statu-
tory authorization within the meaning of this chapter; or
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is imple-
mented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to
constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this chapter.
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rected judges not to interpret appropriations as authorizing military
moves (absent express directions to that effect in the legislation).
The War Powers Act is not part of any criminal code.236
There were five Boland amendments 37 passed by Congress span-
ning the period between December 21, 1982, and October 17,
1986.38 "The"23 9 Boland Amendment provided that during
fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or en-
tity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be
obligated or expended for the purpose of which would have the
effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramili-
tary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization,
movement, or individual. 40
But none of the Boland amendments included any criminal (or
civil) penalties.24'
Congress flinches from shouldering responsibility for the offshore
adventures it finances and fuels with Congress' cheaply-extracted
blood of civilian conscripts:242 The President, reciprocally, hardly
236. Crovitz, What If We Had a War and No One Invited the Lawyers?, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 8, 1990, at All, col. 6.
237. Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1830, 1865 (1982); Pub. L. No. 98-473, §
8066, 98 Stat. 1837, 1935 (1984); Pub. L. No. 99-88, § 106(a), 99 Stat. 293, 328 (1985);
Pub. L. No. 99-169, § 105, 99 Stat. 1002, 1003 (1985); and Pub. L. No. 99-569, § 106, 100
Stat. 3190, 3191 (1986).
238. Crovitz, Crime, the Constitution, and the Iran-Contra Affair, COMMENTARY, Oc-
tober 1987, at 23.
In late 1982, Congressional opposition began to develop against our support of the
Contras and the Salvadoran government. It was usually led by Tip O'Neill and his
friend and fellow congressman from Massachusetts, Edward P. Boland, the Chair-
man of the House Select Committee on Intelligence. They began battling to limit
virtually everything the administration was trying to do in Central America.
R. REAGAN, supra note 202, at 477.
239. Miami Herald, June 7, 1987, at 6C.
240. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat. 1837, 1935 (1984).
241. Crovitz, supra note 236, at All: Crovitz, supra note 238, at 23.
[I]nvestigations have suggested that under [Director of Central Intelligence Wil-
liam] Casey the CIA did a number of things that were improper, and that it ex-
ceeded limits imposed by the Boland Amendment. Because Casey is dead, he cannot
defend himself and we may never know the truth-but I do know that, during part
of this period, a fatal tumor was growing next to Casey's brain. Respected
neurosurgeons have told me that this could have affected his judgment and behavior
during the last part of his life.
R. REAGAN, supra note 202, at 486.
242. The Army proved the lot of 90% of Indochina War draftees. The threat of dying
in Vietnam was 1,900% worse for the Army's soldiers than for Navy or Air Force men. L.
BASKIR & W. STRAUSS. CHANCE AND CIRCUMSTANCE: THE DRAFT, THE WAR AND THE VIET-
NAM GENERATION 54-55 (1978). In 1969, 88% of infantry riflemen in Vietnam were draft-
ees. Glass, Defense Report/Draftees Shoulder Burden of Fighting and Dying in Vietnam,
NAT'L J., Aug. 15, 1970, at 1747.
Spending civilian conscripts remains the Defense Department's war plan: "[I]t must be
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denies (via his veto) the congressional command over the economy.
The post-1936 exercise of presidential foreign policymaking power
is likewise unchecked by the judiciary: The President, reciprocally,
never mounts his bully pulpit to summon passage of legislation ei-
ther curbing inferior federal court jurisdiction, or curtailing the Su-
preme Court's appellate jurisdiction,243 both now being channeled
into making national social policy.
2. The Unchecked Power of Congress. The Congress can today
set minimum wages and maximum employment hours throughout
the economy, even over the states as employers themselves. " " It
can freeze every wage and price in America by invoking its power
to regulate interstate commerce. It expends tax monies on a federal
welfare state constitutionally open-ended. So casually all-embracing
is the congressional taxing power that the Supreme Court openly
supposes nowadays that Congress grants a taxpayer a subsidy if
Congress permits the taxpayer to keep any of the taxpayer's own
income.245
This post-1937 exercise of congressional power expands un-
checked by a President reluctant to veto on constitutional grounds
the bulk of such initiatives: The Congress, reciprocally, will not im-
peach presidents for undeclared wars of whatever variety.2" 6 This
post-1937 brandishing of congressional economic authority likewise
sweeps unchecked by the judiciary, which, not dissimilarly, never in
all history has invalidated any congressional foreign affairs enact-
ment:2 47 Congress, reciprocally, recoils from impeaching Supreme
Court Justices and from curtailing the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
remembered, the present volunteer military is strictly a peacetime force. Any extended con-
flict is expected to require a return to the draft." B. MITCHELL, WEAK LINK: THE FEMINIZA-
TION OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY 219 (1989).
243. Swan, Article III, Section 2, Exceptions Clause Canadian Constitutional Paral-
lels, 13 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 37 (1983).
244. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Swan, The
Political Economy of Commerce Clause - Tenth Amendment Tensions: Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 6 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. 199 (1985).
245. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544, 550
(1983); Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591, 604 (1983).
246. In 1974 the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary refused
to report to the full House a proposed article of impeachment charging President Nixon with
unauthorized secret bombing in Cambodia. H. KOH, supra note 5, at 180 (citing House
Comm. on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Richard Nixon, President of the United States,
H.R. Rep. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 217-19 (1974)). Concededly, this bombing was to
be defended as merely ancillary to either success in, or unilateral withdrawal from, a prior
President's undeclared war.
247. L. HENKIN, supra note 39, at 77.
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3. The Unchecked Power of the Federal Judiciary. The Supreme
Court can today erase the capital punishment statutes of most
states and the abortion laws of all of them. 4" It can constitutional-
ize official state racial discrimination; 4 9 regulate public school cur-
ricula;25 ° forbid voluntary, nondenominational student prayer in
public schools; and protect flagburners. 5 1 As U.S. Senator-elect
Dan Quayle told political scientist Richard F. Fenno, Jr., in 1980:
"I know one committee I don't want-Judiciary. They are going to
be dealing with all those issues like abortion, busing, voting rights,
prayers. I'm not interested in those issues, and I want to stay as far
away from them as I can."2 52 Quayle, a lawyer, well understood
that those Senators who really do have a social policy agenda im-
plement it through not majority rule but the federal judiciary. This
post-1938 exercise of Supreme Court social policymaking power
waxes unchecked by the President and Congress, as just observed.
VI. THE STATES AND PRESIDENTIAL OVERSEAS MILITARY
ADVENTURES
Since 1936-1938 the three branches of the federal government,
which is of theoretically limited power, have arrived at an implicit
accommodation mutually reinforcing each of their respective shares
of the power of a central government completely unchecked (be-
248. Harvard Law School's widely-respected Professor Laurence Tribe recalled:
So it seems a serious mistake to assume that the partial success of legislative reform
movements in a few key states would have been replicated elsewhere if Roe v. Wade
had not intervened .... Indeed, it is instructive in this regard that between 1971 and
1973 not one additional state moved to repeal its criminal prohibition on abortion
early in pregnancy....
There is little evidence that the United States was on the verge of emerging, in
the early 1970s, from the long shadow of shame that had branded women as blame-
worthy for extramarital sex and nonprocreative sex and that condemned them for
choosing abortion even when the choice was a painful and profoundly reluctant one.
L. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 51 (1990).
249. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (Powell, J.).
In enjoining petitioner from ever considering the race of any applicant .. . the
courts below failed to recognize that the State has a substantial interest that legiti-
mately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the com-
petitive consideration of race and ethnic origin. For this reason, so much of the
California court's judgment as enjoins petitioner from any consideration of the race
of any applicant must be reversed.
Id.
250. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
251. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
252. R. FENNO. JR., THE MAKING OF A SENATOR DAN QUAYLE 20 (1989). Richard
Fenno is, of course, the author of R. FENNO, HOMESTYLE (1978), the "famous essay on par-
ticipant observation." Pitney, The Mixed Blessings of Graduate School, 23 PS: POLITICAL
SCIENCE & POLITICS 432, 433 (1990).
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cause no longer checking itself). Each branch (within its own
sphere) commands the defenseless states, 253 which created the cen-
tral government, 254 but retain no machinery whereby to check any
federal branch.2 5
A. Dukakis v. United States Department of Defense
For example, in Dukakis v. United States Department of De-
fense25' an action was brought by Governor Michael Dukakis and
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts against the U.S. Defense De-
partment and other federal agencies and officials. Their complaint
asked the district court to declare the Montgomery Amendment257
unconstitutional under the Militia Training Clause2 58 insofar as
that federal statute restricts the authority of the Governor to deny
consent to training outside the U.S. of members or units of the
Massachusetts National Guard or the Massachusetts unit of the
National Guard of the United States.259
The district court's Dukakis opinion is of particular value. Its
judgment was affirmed on the basis of the District C6urt's "well
reasoned opinion. 26 ° (The Supreme Court denied a petition for a
writ of certiorari.) 26 1
The Armies Clause of article I empowers Congress "To raise and
support Armies. '26 2 But the Militia Clause of article I provides
that Congress have the power:
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
253. As was suggested in Swan, supra note 27, at 398-99.
254. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
255. Except that presidential electors are chosen in each state as determined by their
respective state legislature:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to
which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or Representative,
or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be
appointed an Elector.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. In South Carolina, both presidential electors and state officials
were chosen not by popular vote but by the legislature until after the War Between the
States. E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICAN'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at
194-95 (1988).
256. Dukakis v. United States Dep't of Defense, 686 F. Supp. 30 (D. Mass. 1988),
aftid, 859 F. 2d 1066 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1743 (1989).
257. 10 U.S.C. § 672 (f) (1988).
258. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
259. Dukakis, 686 F. Supp. at 31, 34.
260. Dukakis v. United States Dep't of Defense, 859 F.2d 1066, 1067 (1st Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1743 (1989).
261. Massachusetts v. United States Dep't of Defense, 109 S. Ct. 1743 (1989).
262. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
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Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for gov-
erning such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of
the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Ap-
pointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Mili-
tia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress ... 263
In the Selective Draft Law Cases26 4 the Supreme Court during
1918 vindicated the congressional power to compel military service
in the face of the claim that the Militia Clause limited the congres-
sional authority to conscript under the Armies Clause.
Governor Dukakis argued that members of the National Guard
never cease to be members of the "militia," and so always are sub-
ject to the limitations of the Militia Clause: the Militia Clause res-
ervation of power to the states limits congressional power under the
Armies Clause. Otherwise Congress simply could circumvent the
reservation to the states of militia-training power by calling the mi-
litia to active duty under the Armies Clause.2 6 5 Since the only pur-
poses for which Congress is authorized by Militia Clause (15) is
mustering the militia to execute U.S. law, suppress insurrection,
and repel invasion, under the plaintiff's rationale training missions
in Central America would have been unconstitutional with or with-
out Governor Dukakis's consent unless Militia Clause (16) is given
a meaning beyond that of Militia Clause (15).166
Guided by the Selective Draft Law Cases, the Court concluded
that the reservation of power to the states over training the militia
(expressed in the Militia Clause) did not override the congressional
power to raise armies.2"7 The fact that after the Selective Draft
Law Cases the militia may in some sense depend upon Congress for
its existence does not render their relationship unconstitutional.2 6 8
B. Perpich v. United States Department of Defense
In his June 11, 1990, opinion for a unanimous Supreme Court in
Perpich v. United States Department of Defense,26 9 Justice Stevens
defined the Perpich question as whether Congress may authorize
the President to order members of the National Guard to active
263. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15, 16.
264. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
265. Dukakis, 686 F. Supp. at 35.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 37.
268. Id. at 38.
269. Perpich v. United States Dep't of Defense, 110 S. Ct. 2418 (1990).
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duty for purposes of training outside the United States in peace-
time without either the consent of a state governor or declaration of
national emergency.270
A gubernatorial consent requirement which had been enacted in
the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952271 was partially repealed in
1986 by the Montgomery Amendment, enacted as part of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, providing
that such gubernatorial consent could not be withheld respective
active duty outside the United States due to any objection to the
locale, purpose, type or schedule of such active duty.272 Governor
Rudy Perpich of Minnesota challenged the constitutionality of the
Montgomery Amendment as violative of the Militia Clauses. He
alleged that the Montgomery Amendment had prevented the Gov-
ernor from denying his consent to a training mission in Central
America for certain members of the Minnesota National Guard
during January 1987.273
Since 1933 all persons enlisting in a state National Guard unit
have enlisted simultaneously in the National Guard of the United
States. In this latter capacity they become a part of the Enlisted
Reserve Corps of the Army, yet unless and until ordered to active
duty in the Army, they retain their status as members of a separate
state Guard unit.27" Under "dual enlistment" provisions of the 1933
amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916,275 a member of
the Guard ordered to active duty in the federal service is thereby
relieved of his status in the state Guard for his entire period of
federal service.276 In 1952 Congress broadly authorized orders to
active duty or to active duty for training without any emergency
requirement, but provided such orders could not be carried out ab-
sent gubernatorial consent.27 7
Gubernatorial consents to training missions were routinely ob-
tained before 1985. The Governor of California in 1985 refused his
consent to a training mission in Honduras for 450 members of the
270. Id. at 2420.
271. Pub. L. No. 476, §§ 233(c), 233(d), 66 Stat. 481, 490 (1952) (current version at
10 U.S.C. §§ 672(b), 672(d) (1988)).
272. Pub. L. 99-661, § 522, 100 Stat. 3816, 3871 (1986) (current version at 10 U.S.C.
§ 672(f) (1988)).
273. Perpich, 110 S. Ct. at 2421.
274. Id. at 2425.
275. Ch. 87, § 8, 48 Stat 153, 156-57 (1933) (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§
3261(b), 8261(b) (1988)).
276. Perpich, 110 S. Ct. at 2425.
277. Id.
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California National Guard. The Governor of Maine denied his con-
sent to a similar mission shortly thereafter. Those incidents led to
the enactment of the Montgomery Amendment. The Perpich litiga-
tion ensued."'
Governor Perpich's assault against the Montgomery Amendment
depended partly upon the traditional understanding that "the Mili-
tia" only can be called forth for limited purposes not including ei-
ther foreign service or nonemergency conditions, and partially upon
the explicit wording of the Militia Clause reserving to the states the
authority of training the Militia.
279
The members of the National Guard of Minnesota ordered into
federal service with the National Guard of the United States lose
their status as members of the state's militia during their active
duty span. 28 ° The active duty affiliation is entirely federal.28 After
all, the Supreme Court recalled with approval that its decision in
Selective Draft Law Cases2" 2 had held that the Militia Clauses do
not restrict the congressional powers to provide for the common de-
fense, raise and support armies, to make rules for the government
and regulation of the land and naval forces, and to enact laws nec-
essary and proper to executing those powers.283
Governor Perpich asserted that so interpreting the Militia Clause
practically extinguishes an important state power expressly reserved
in the Constitution. But Justice Stevens explained that it merely
recognized the federal supremacy in the military affairs field. Were
the federal training mission to interfere with the State Guard's ca-
pability to respond to local emergencies, the Montgomery Amend-
ment itself would permit the Governor to veto the prospective mis-
sion. 284 Furthermore, Congress provides by statute that a state
may, at its own expense, constitute a defense force additional to its
National Guard, which defense force is exempt from being drafted
into the United States Armed Forces. 285 Worse for Governor
Perpich, Stevens offered that were it not for the Militia Clauses it
actually might be possible to contend that the constitutional alloca-
tion of powers precluded formation of an organized state militia
278. Id. at 2426.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 375, 377, 381-84 (1918).
283. Perpich, 110 S. Ct. at 2427.
284. Id. at 2428.
285. 32 U.S.C. § 109(c) (1988).
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altogether."'
The gubernatorial veto established in 1952 (and partially re-
pealed in 1986) was not constitutionally compelled. The Montgom-
ery Amendment, consistent as it is with the Militia Clauses, is con-
stitutionally valid."8 7 The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that the state's
power to train the militia does not conflict with the congressional
authority to raise armies for the common defense and to control the
training of federal reserve forces.2 8 Perpich, like Dukakis, evi-
dences the helplessness of the states when their National Guard
troops are sent abroad on presidential adventures or misadventures.
CONCLUSION
Rivkin and Block are correct as to the law in their articulation of
the contemporary theory of a bifurcated presidency, at least insofar
as the Constitutional law is defined descriptively and predictively.
Post-Curtiss-Wright, the President indeed shares power in domestic
lawmaking but fashions foreign policy wholly unchecked by any ju-
dicially-enforced rule of law. This concisely describes and predicts
the Presidential foreign policymaking role as it has developed since
1936. In fact, Rivkin and Block understate their case.
Functionally speaking, they well could have added that since
1937 the post-Jones & Laughlin Congress makes national economic
policy wholly unchecked by any judicially-enforced rule of law, and
that since 1938 the post-Carolene Products Supreme Court makes
national social policy wholly unchecked by any constitutional prin-
ciple. Constitutional scholars need not examine articles I, II, and
III to describe and predict the respective performances of Congress,
the President, and the Supreme Court. Study of Jones & Laughlin,
Curtiss-Wright, and Carolene Products suffices alone to crack the
functionalist code.289
286. Perpich, 110 S.Ct. at 2429.
287. Id. at 2430.
288. Perpich v. United States Dep't of Defense, 880 F.2d 11, 17-18 (8th Cir. 1989)
(en banc), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2418 (1990).
289. Hence, the descriptive element of the instant analysis is contrary to the aspira-
tions articulated by the respected Prof. Louis Henkin:
Constitutionalism implies limited government. For our subject, that means that the
Constitution should be expounded so that there can be no extraconstitutional gov-
ernment, that, in principle and in effect, no activity of government is exempt from
constitutional restraints, not even foreign affairs: government cannot exercise unlim-
ited authority in any large area - not even in foreign affairs. We have remained
committed to limited government, if no longer from a priori commitment to the
limited purposes of government then from abiding commitment to individual rights.
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However, Rivkin and Block may be seriously incorrect as to the
law insofar as the constitutional law is defined either normatively or
explanatorily. Serious error normatively may be discerned in the
Rivkin-Block paper if the appropriate constitutional norm is identi-
fied from the Framers' and Ratifiers' original intent. Correspond-
ingly, serious error explanatorily is discerned in the Rivkin-Block
paper through their understandable omission of exactly why the
three (mutually reinforcing) federal branches of the federal govern-
ment divide their labor (at the expense of state prerogatives) as
they do. The contemporary interbranch division of labor having
emerged step by step (i.e., branch by branch) in 1936, 1937, and
1938, future appraisal of the constitutional revolution of March 4,
1933 - April 4, 1937, is appropriate toward explaining today's long-
postrevolutionary status quo.
We continue to revere checks and balances and some separation of powers, perhaps
from habit or piety, perhaps from an underlying commitment to avoiding concentra-
tion of power. For us, as for the framers, no branch of government has authority
that is so large as to be essentially undefined and uncircumscribed, that is "ple-
nary," that is not checked, not balanced, not even the President, not even in foreign
affairs.
L. HENKIN, supra note 39, at 36.
[Vol. 21
36
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 1 [1990], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol21/iss1/4
37
Swan: The Political Economy of Presidential Foreign Policymaking: The C
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1990
ESSAYS ON PIRACY
SYMPOSIUM ON PIRACY IN CONTEMPORARY NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The California Western International Law Journal is pleased to
publish the proceedings of a symposium on Piracy in Contemporary
National and International Law, held in New York City on April
25-26, 1990, under the auspices of the American Bar Association's
Law of the Sea Committee, Section of International Law and Prac-
tice. Professor John Noyes, Chair of the ABA Law of the Sea
Committee, chaired the New York program and has written the
introductory essay in this symposium. The essays by Eric Ellen, Al-
fred Rubin, Barry Dubner, and Samuel Menefee were originally
prepared for the panel discussion in this symposium.
In his introductory essay on the international law of piracy, John
Noyes explores such issues as defining "piracy," the inter-relation-
ship between international law and municipal law and process, and
jurisdictional and process issues that U.S. courts confront in piracy
cases today. Eric Ellen examines examples of recent attacks on the
high seas1 and the involvement of the ICC International Maritime
Bureau in the fight against "such malpractices afloat." Alfred
Rubin and Barry Dubner examine at length the treatment of piracy
under municipal and international law and suggest appropriate le-
gal responses to the problems of piracy. Finally, Samuel Menefee
analyzes the piracy statutes under title 18, chapter 81 of the United
States Code and suggests alternative approaches in redrafting the
statutes to resolve contemporary problems in the area of piracy.
California Western International Law Journal
1. For a recent assessment of the problems of piracy, see Pirates Setting Sail for New
Plunder, L.A. Times, Nov. 27, 1990, at HI.
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